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Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?

Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posnert
Politicians and commentators have from time to time proposed that
regulations be suspended or delayed during recessions because of their adverse
impact on employment. We evaluate this argument from within a
macroeconomicframework. When the business cycle is taken into account, it is
possible that regulations should be weakened during downturns and
strengthenedduring upturns, along the lines of stimulus policy, which normally
takes the form of countercyclical adjustments to taxes or the money supply.
However, countercyclical regulation will normally be a less efficient means of
stimulus. For that reason, it should be used in relative narrow conditions, and
when the other stimulus instruments are either ineffective on their own terms or
politically infeasible.
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Introduction
In 2011, the Obama administration withdrew a proposed Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") rule which would have strengthened the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone. The White House explained that,
while it supported stronger environmental regulations, it was unwise to push
ahead with them during a weak economic recovery because of their possible
adverse effects on job growth. It promised to revisit the issue in 2013, and in
2015 the Obama administration finally issued a stricter ozone rule, in a
healthier macroeconomic environment.'
While many people saw an unwelcome intrusion of politics into the
rulemaking process, we are interested in evaluating the White House's policy
justification for the delay. The suggestion is that the ozone rule would have
increased unemployment had it taken effect in 2011, while the same rule would
not have increased unemployment had it taken effect in 2015 or would have
done so only modestly and at lower social cost. What is interesting about this
argument is that it is a macroeconomic argument relating to the timing of
regulation. Many economists believe that the government can stimulate the
economy during a recession by lowering interest rates, cutting taxes, or
increasing government spending. Because regulations are functionally similar
to taxes, this argument might also imply that the government can stimulate the
economy during recessions by delaying, suspending, or weakening regulations.
The argument simultaneously suggests that the costs of regulation might be
different depending on the macroeconomic condition of the economy. A
regulation might lead to significant unemployment during a recession, and each
lost job might impose significant costs on the laid-off worker; but the same
regulation might involve many fewer lost jobs, and much lower cost, during
normal or economic boom times.2 If agencies could take account of these
macroeconomic effects on a large scale, regulatory policy would be
countercyclical.
Congress has also gotten into the act. From time to time, members of
Congress have proposed bills that would require agencies to suspend regulatory
activity during recessions. For example, the Regulation Moratorium and Jobs
Preservation Act of 2011 stated that "No agency may take any significant
1.
See John M. Broder, Obama Administration Abandons Stricter Air-Quality Rules,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/03/science/earth/03air.html;
Press Release, The White House,
Statement by the President on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011),
https://www.wbitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/02/statement-president-ozone-national-ambientair-quality-standards; Alex Guillen, Obama's New Ozone StandardHas Greens Seeing Red, POLITICO
(Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/obama-administration-tightens-regulations-forsmog-causing-ozone-pollution-214323.
2.
See Yair Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of
Recessions, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 791 (2017).
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regulatory action, until the Bureau of Labor Statistics average of monthly
unemployment rates for any quarter beginning after the date of enactment of
this Act is equal to or less than 7.7 percent." 3 The sponsor of the bill, Senator
Ron Johnson, hoped to block an EPA regulation of industrial boilers that he
believed could risk 338,000 jobs.4 But the bill allowed EPA and other agencies
to regulate once unemployment fell, in the spirit of President Obama's
approach to the ozone regulation.
Is there a valid basis for President Obama's and Senator Johnson's claims
that regulation should be cut back during periods of high unemployment?
Critics of regulation have, for quite some time, argued that regulation increases
unemployment. From a microeconomic standpoint, this criticism is misguided.
In neoclassical models of the labor market, unemployment is not a social cost.
If a cost-benefit analysis ("CBA")-justified regulation causes firms to fire
workers, this means that employment of the workers was socially wastefulthey were participating in production that caused net social costs. The
unemployment rate will increase as the workers seek new jobs or retrain, but
the temporary increase in joblessness merely reflects (in this model) the
workers' own (presumably) rational estimate of the costs and benefits of taking
a new job at a lower wage, searching further, or retraining. If regulations cause
a permanent increase in unemployment, that is just an unfortunate byproduct of
structural factors. And even if regulations fail CBAs and are issued nonetheless
(as many critics appear to assume), the effect on unemployment is largely
irrelevant from a social welfare perspective under the traditional model. For
these reasons, CBA has never included costs or benefits related to
unemployment generated by regulation.
In recent work, we have argued that regulators should try to incorporate
unemployment costs into their models. But in making our argument, we
remained largely within the microeconomic/neoclassical perspective. We
pointed out that studies showed that workers who lost their jobs incurred quite
substantial costs, and there was no reason to believe that they were fully
compensated ex ante by their wages.
In this Article, we revisit this argument from the macroeconomic
perspective taken by President Obama and Senator Johnson. Our focus is on the
possibility, forcefully suggested by Yair Listokin, that under certain conditions
regulation could be used as a macroeconomic policy tool. 6 A regulation is a

3.

S.1438, 112th Cong. (2011).

See Press Release, Senator Ron Johnson, Johnson Introduces Regulation
Moratorium
and
Job
Preservation
Act
(June
28,
2011),
http://www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/index.cfin/2011/7/johnson-introduces-regulation-moratoriumand-job-preservation-act.
5.
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 98 VA. L. REV. 579 (2012). See also DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS? (Cary Coglianese, Adam
4.

M. Finkel & Christopher Carrigan, eds. 2015).
and

6.
See, e.g., Listokin, supranote 2; Yair Listokin, A Theoretical Framework for Law
Macroeconomics
(Yale
Law & Economics
Research
Paper No.
567,
2016),
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kind of tax, so one would expect regulations, holding all else equal, to suppress
economic activity. In principle, the government could stimulate economic
activity during recessions by weakening existing regulations-just as tax
reduction is a common response to recession. The government could also
suppress economic activity during booms by strengthening regulations or
creating new regulations-just as taxes should be raised during upturns. In
short, regulation should be countercyclical, just like monetary and fiscal policy.
While the idea of countercyclical regulation may seem novel, there is in
fact precedent for it. The capital regulations issued under the first two Basel
Accords were criticized for being procyclical. When banks and other financial
institutions fund projects, they usually try to use a large amount of leverage.
However, capital regulations limit the amount of leverage available to banks by
requiring banks to maintain a minimum ratio of equity to debt. This diminishes
the amount of risk externalized to the financial system. One effect of this
approach is that during booms, a bank's assets may become overvalued,
allowing the bank to increase its lending; during busts, a bank's assets may
become undervalued, requiring the bank to reduce its lending. However, the
macroeconomic goal is the opposite: to encourage banks to lend less during
booms and more during busts. Accordingly, current law directs banking
regulators to make capital regulations countercyclical. Regulators have
accomplished this goal to a limited extent by allowing banks to draw on capital
Commentators have proposed
"buffers" during economic downturns.
additional policies to make capital regulations more consistently
countercyclical, as we will discuss later in this Article.
We discuss whether this logic may apply to other types of regulation like
environmental regulation, and we explore the legality and practicality of such
an approach. Adjusting regulation to reflect the state of economy involves
substantial practical hurdles. Once regulations are put in place, they may
endure for many years. Regulators are too busy to revisit them whenever a
https://ssm.com/abstract-2860283. There is a small literature in economics that addresses these
questions, mostly in the context of environmental regulation. See Carolyn Fischer & Garth Heutel,
EnvironmentalMacroeconomics, ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 5 (2013) for a survey; and more recently,
Richard Rogerson, A Macroeconomic Perspective on Evaluating Environmental Regulations, REV.
ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y (2013) (modeling effects of regulation on macroeconomic variables); Yazid
Dissou & Lilia Kamizova, Emissions Cap or Emissions Tax? A Multi-Sector Business Cycle Analysis,
79 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 169 (2016); Barbara Annicchiaricoa & Fabio Di Diob, EnvironmentalPolicy
and Macroeconomic Dynamics in a New Keynesian Model, 69 J. ENvTL. ECON. MGMT. 1 (2015); see
also Robert J. Brent, Overview of the Fieldand the Contributions in the Handbook, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH ON COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2009).
7.
See Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K Kashyap, & Jeremy C. Stein, A Macroprudential
Approach to FinancialRegulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5 (2011).
See Federal Reserve System, Regulatory Capital Rules: The Federal Reserve
8.
Board's Framework for Implementing the U.S. Basel III Countercyclical Capital Buffer, 12 C.F.R. §

217,

Appendix

A

(2016),

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20160908bI.pdf.
For example, a rule defining the phrase "waters of the United States" (and thus the
9.

scope of the Clean Water Act) was promulgated in 1986. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1986); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2
(1986). It was not amended or updated until 2015. 40 C.F.R § 230.3 (2015).
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boom or bust occurs, and regulatory activity is often too slow to respond
effectively to temporary downturns. Nor is it practical to introduce some kind
of static macroeconomic discount or multiplier at the time that the regulation is
first promulgated. While, for example, a concern about unemployment might
create a general bias against regulation, a concern about general
macroeconomic effects does not produce a consistent bias for or against
regulation. Instead, it requires the regulations to be adjusted over time in
response to changing macroeconomic conditions.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we offer some background
on macroeconomic theory and the types of policy tools typically used in
macroeconomic policymaking. In Part II, we examine the case for
countercyclical regulation. In Part III, we discuss the institutional dynamics of
a macroeconomic approach to regulation and consider the mechanisms for
tailoring regulation to macro conditions.
I. Background on Macroeconomic Stimulus Policy
Stimulus policy is based on a theory of the economy that assumes that
prices do not immediately adjust to changes in supply and demand.10 On this
theory, businesses invest in inventory based on predictions about future
economy activity. When those predictions are falsified by events, businesses
own either too much or too little inventory. If they own too much inventory,
they lay off workers and reduce investment until the inventory is sold off. If
these pullbacks occur across the economy, unemployment rises. The laid-off
workers reduce their spending, which further inflates inventories, causing
businesses to lay off additional workers in a downward spiral. On the other
hand, if inventories are smaller than needed in order to satisfy consumer
demand, businesses will borrow heavily and hire additional workers who will
spend additional money, further increasing demand in an upward spiral. The
result is the familiar boom-and-bust pattern of economic growth."
With stimulus policy, the government attempts to moderate the business
cycle. There are two basic approaches: monetary policy, through which the
Federal Reserve takes action to raise and lower interest rates, and fiscal policy,
through which Congress cuts taxes or increases spending. We discuss those
approaches and then turn to a third option, automatic stabilizers, which are a
variant of fiscal stimulus.

10.
There is a different theory that puts emphasis on the distortions caused by taxation
rather than price stickiness, but this seems to be a minority view.
11.

See N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS (8th ed. 2012), for a textbook

treatment.
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A. Monetary andFiscalPolicy
Monetary policy takes place through the central bank, the Federal Reserve
("Fed"). As an economy enters recession, the Fed attempts to lower market
interest rates. It does this typically by buying liquid, low-risk securities like
treasuries from private institutions known as primary dealers-the major banks
and investment banks. As the Fed buys from the primary dealers, those
institutions accumulate cash, which they turn around and lend out to other
banks and lend to or invest in private firms. The surge of money in the
economy reduces the market interest rate. Businesses can therefore borrow
money more easily, allowing them to retain or hire workers. Consumers can
also borrow more easily, allowing them to buy houses, cars, and other goods.
This consumer behavior increases aggregate demand, which draws down
inventories, taking the economy out of recession.
As the economy leaves recession and heats up, the Fed reverses course
and now sells the securities that it had bought during the recession (and perhaps
other securities in its portfolio). As it sells the securities, cash leaves the
economy, and interest rates rise, suppressing economic growth. The goal is to
reduce variance in economic growth, as well as manage inflation and mitigate
cyclical unemployment, as opposed to targeting structural unemployment.
The government can also use fiscal policy to strengthen aggregate demand
by cutting taxes or increasing public spending. When it cuts taxes, it increases
the take-home pay of workers, who (in theory) spend some of the additional
money on goods and services. The providers of those goods and services are
then able to spend the additional money they have earned on other goods and
services, increasing the flow of money throughout the economy. Purchases of
goods also draw down inventories. As inventories fall, businesses rehire
workers, who spend their paychecks on more goods, drawing down inventories
further.12 When the government increases spending, it directly hires workers or
pays businesses for goods or services, which the businesses must hire workers
to supply. Government purchases draw down inventories both directly, as the
government purchases goods, and indirectly, as the newly hired workers
purchase goods with their pay. In both cases, the government action
reverberates through the economy: workers who are hired use their pay to buy
goods, which draws down inventories, which requires businesses to hire more
workers, who in turn buy goods as well, and so on. This leads to a multiplier
effect. A single dollar in stimulus can increase economic output by more than a
dollar, depending on how the stimulus is structured.
The government finances tax cuts and spending through deficit financing;
eventually it must repay the debt through tax increases and spending cuts.
These adjustments will cut short the boom, so that the overall effect is both to

This is the famous "Keynesian Cross," the simplest model of sticky wages. See
12.
MANKtW, supra note 11.
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reduce variance in economic outcomes and to raise total long run output in the
face of inadequate aggregate demand.
Critics of fiscal stimulus have argued that businesses and consumers
would not adjust their behavior in response to a stimulus because they know
that the government will impose additional costs on them in the future. There
are also significant questions about how people react to stimulus measures. If
consumers save the proceeds from tax cuts, as they often do, the tax cut will not
stimulate the economy. Many economists also argue that the government does
not have enough information about the economy to engage in the sort of "finetuning" that fiscal stimulus policy requires.13 Fiscal stimulus policy is always a
step behind the economy, so an intervention can mistakenly stimulate the
economy after the recession has ended, leading the economy to overheat during
the boom cycle.14 That said, we assume for the purpose of this Article that the
defenders of stimulus policy are right, and that fiscal stimulus can have a
beneficial effect on the economy.
Indeed, the empirical literature gives the edge to the defenders of fiscal
stimulus. One survey of empirical studies found government spending
multipliers that varied from -3.8 to +3.8 and tax cut multipliers that varied from
-4.8 to +3.0, depending on the stimulus being studied and the methodological
approach used to model its effect.' 5 Another more limited survey of the
literature on fiscal stimulus in the United States found multipliers ranging from
6
+0.5 to +2.5 for direct government spending, to +0.1 to +1.5 for tax cuts.'
Individual studies typically arrive at much tighter estimates. One leading study
estimates fiscal multipliers at approximately +3.0.17 While the choice of
modeling methodology can greatly affect estimates of fiscal multipliers, and
differences in models are responsible for a large percentage of the observed
variation, there appears to be a general consensus that fiscal multipliers are
positive,' 8 and that spending leads to higher multipliers than tax cuts.19 This
latter point is due to the fact that public spending involves an initial round of
economic activity-the spending itself-followed by subsequent rounds as the

13.
See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, William G. Gale, & Benjamin H. Harris, Activist
FiscalPolicy, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 141 (2010).
14.
See Valerie A. Ramey, Can Government PurchasesStimulate the Economy?, 49 J.
ECON. LIT. 673 (2011); John Taylor, An Empirical Analysis of the Revival of Fiscal Activism in the
2000s, 49 J. EcoN. LIT. 686 (2011).
15.
See Patrick Van Brusselen, Fiscal Stabilisation Plans and the Outlook for the
World Economy, FED. PLANNING BUREAU 18 (2009).

16.

See Charles J. Whalen & Felix Reichling, The Fiscal Multiplier and Economic

Policy Analysis in the United States, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE 12 (2015).
17.
See Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax
Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 763, 782-84

(2010).
18.
19.

See WHALEN & REICHLING, supra note 16, at 4.
See Van Brusselen, supra note 15, at 3.
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money percolates through the economy, while tax cuts or rebates do not
involve the initial (government) round of economic activity.20
The United States gross domestic product was roughly $17.95 trillion in
2015,21 so an economic stimulus program must be substantial if it is to make
any serious dent. The largest such program on record is the American Recovery
and Restoration Act of 2009, which involved $862 billion in additional
22
spending, tax cuts, and transfers to state and local governments. This was
equivalent to 5.5% of that year's GDP, though it was spread over several
years.23 Stimulus packages in non-U.S. OECD countries during the same time
period averaged 2.5% of GDP.24 The largest stimulus program enacted during
25
the Great Depression totaled only 1.5% of GDP. President George W. Bush's
2003 tax cut, which had an estimated size of $350 billion (about 3% of GDP),
was also promoted as a stimulus program.26
Among those economists who support stimulus policy, the majority
believe that the government should use monetary policy before resorting to
fiscal policy.27 The principal reason is the comparative speed and ease with
which monetary policy can be implemented. Policymakers at the Federal
Reserve can begin purchasing securities or lower interest rates in a matter of
days (or even hours) after deciding that an economic downturn is taking place.
By contrast, fiscal policy, whether tax cuts or spending, typically requires
congressional action. Stimulus bills can be stalled in Congress for lengthy
periods, by which point the macroeconomic situation might have changed
dramatically, or even fail to pass Congress at all.
At the same time, once a stimulus policy has been enacted, there may be a
lag before the stimulus begins to affect the economy. Monetary policy operates
primarily by lowering the cost to businesses of investing in new facilities and
equipment and hiring new workers. However, economists believe that most
businesses make investment decisions approximately six months in advance.28

20.

See id.

See BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT: FOURTH
(2016),
2015
ANNUAL
AND
QUARTER
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2016/gdp4ql 5_3rd.htm.
See Alan J. Auerbach et al., Activist Fiscal Policy, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 141, 152
22.
21.

(2010).
23.
24.
25.

Bank

See id. at 154.
See id
See Christina D. Romer, "Back from the Brink," Address to the Federal Reserve

of

Chicago

(Sept.

24,

2009),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/cea/BackFromTheBrink.
Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R.2, the "Jobs and
26.
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003," U.S. CONG. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX'N (May 22,
2003), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1746. Many economists criticized
this tax cut as overly costly and largely ineffective at stimulating economic growth. See Economic
Cuts
(2003),
Tax
Bush
the
Opposing
Statement
Economists'
Institute,
Policy
http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/old/stmt/2003/statement signed.pdf.
See MANKIW, supra note 11, at 552-55.
27.

28.
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Accordingly, the effects of a change in monetary policy will typically be visible
only after that much time has passed. For fiscal policy, the time lag depends
greatly upon the type of policy chosen. Public spending often involves the
construction of infrastructure projects that may take significant time to plan and
execute. Once a project has been selected, the government must still hire
employees (or a private contractor, who must then hire employees) and begin
placing purchases. Delay can be exacerbated by bureaucratic red tape.
Construction projects, for example, can be delayed for months and years while
officials obtain approvals from federal, state, and local regulatory agencies.
Direct payments to state and local governments will similarly affect the
economy only as quickly as those governments use the additional money to hire
new workers or make new purchases (or retain workers who would have been
laid off). Tax cuts, for their part, will often affect workers' disposable income
almost immediately if they reduce the amount of taxes withheld in weekly
paychecks. Most recent stimulus packages, including President Obama's 2009
stimulus29 and President Bush's 2003 stimulus,30 have been structured to

reduce tax withholding immediately, although this is not necessarily always the
case. Some tax cuts take effect only at the end of the year.
Despite the advantages of monetary policy, the Federal Reserve's ability
to stimulate the economy by lowering interest rates is limited. In a severe
economic downturn, even lowering interest rates to zero might not be enough
to effectively stimulate the economy. The Federal Reserve cannot lower rates
(much) below zero because investors can always hold money as cash instead of
depositing it at negative rates. When the Federal Reserve reaches this "zero
lower bound," its options are limited to more exotic measures that are less
effective. For economists who support stimulus policy, the case for fiscal
policy is strongest when interest rates have reached the zero lower bound.
Because of the delays in implementing stimulus policies, particularly
fiscal stimulus, policymakers have come to rely more heavily on stimulus
policies that take effect automatically without active government intervention.
Those types of policies are the subject of the next section.
B. Automatic Stabilizers
Automatic stabilizers are policies that are permanently in place-so that
discretionary government action is not needed-but have the same effect as
targeted macroeconomic interventions. Ordinary income taxes are automatic
stabilizers because they partly counter the normal cyclical pattern of disposable
income. On average, people earn more during booms than busts (in part
because of bonuses but mainly because more people are employed). As a result,
29.

H.R.1 111th Cong. (2009).

30.
See The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, ACCOUNTING
WEB (June 4, 2003), http://www.accountingweb.com/practice/growth/the-jobs-and-growth-tax-reliefreconciliation-act-of-2003.
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they pay more taxes during booms than during busts. Thus, their disposable
income rises during busts relative to its level if taxes did not exist. Similarly,
welfare and unemployment programs are countercyclical. More people receive
welfare or unemployment insurance during busts than during booms, which
means that the government pumps more money into the economy during busts
than during booms.
Automatic stabilizers work best when they shift money to low-income
people during recessions. The reason is that low-income people spend a larger
share of their paycheck than high-income people, who save a portion of it.
Thus, welfare programs are an effective source of stabilization. While a flat tax
like the payroll tax also can stabilize, progressive taxes are even more effective
because they shift a greater amount of spending from booms to recessions.
Despite the vigorous debate over stimulus generally, there is close to a
consensus that automatic stabilization does have valuable macroeconomic
properties. However, this consensus comes with some caveats. In a recent
paper, Alisdair McKay and Ricardo Reis found that automatic stabilizers that
operate by providing individuals with additional disposable income-such as
reductions in income tax rates-actually do relatively little to stabilize
aggregate demand. 31 Automatic stabilizers that function as social insurance,
such as unemployment benefits or food stamps, are significantly more
effective. The macroeconomic context matters as well. McKay and Reis found
that automatic stabilizers have greater impact when interest rates are at the zero
lower bound and the role of monetary policy is reduced.32
Automatic stabilizers can be quite substantial, particularly during severe
economic downturns such as the Great Recession of the last decade. During
fiscal year 2012, automatic stabilizers in the United States totaled $386 billion,
or 2.3% of potential GDP. 33 Those figures dropped to $277 billion and 1.6% of
potential GDP in 201334 and $192 billion and 1.1% of potential GDP in 201435
as economic conditions in the United States slowly improved. Nonetheless, in
just those three years, automatic stabilizers accounted for $855 billion in
spending, roughly equivalent to President Obama's 2009 fiscal stimulus. One
model of automatic stabilizers during the same time period concluded that
automatic stabilizers, principally the income tax, had the capacity to mitigate
32% of lost income in the United States and 38% of lost income in the

31.
Alisdair McKay & Ricardo Reis, The Role of Automatic Stabilizers in the U.S.
Business Cycle, 84 ECONOMETRICA 141 (2016).

32.

Id.

See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS
33.
ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET AS OF 2013 (Mar. 2013), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/43977.
34.
See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS
ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET AS OF 2014 (Mar. 2014), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-

congress-2013-2014/reports/45010/45010-breakout-AppendixE.pdf.
35.
See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS
ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET AS OF 2015 (Mar. 2015), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/1 14th-

congress-2015-2016/reports/49892/49892-breakout-AppendixD.pdf.
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European Union in cases where workers kept their jobs but saw wages
decline.36 Where workers became unemployed-creating larger income shocks
but also triggering additional automatic stabilizers such as unemployment
insurance-the mitigation amounted to 34% of lost wages in the United States
and 47% in the European Union. 37 These results are not unique to the past
decade. An earlier study of automatic stabilizers between 1962 and 1995 found
that income and payroll taxes alone offset approximately 8% of any shock to
GDP.38
II. Implications for Regulation
Regulations are similar to taxes, and for that reason a case may be made
that if tax cuts can be used for fiscal stimulus, then "regulatory cuts" may be
used as well. But the argument is more complex than it seems at first. Not all
taxes are equally useful for fiscal stimulus, and regulations similarly vary in
ways that make some of them more appropriate for stimulus than others.
In the analysis below, we will use the following terms. A "regulatory cut"
or "regulatory suspension" refers to an action by an agency to reduce or
eliminate the impact of a regulation on industry. As we discuss later, a
regulatory cut could take many different forms, including the formal
suspension of a regulation, but also ad hoc approaches like reducing the
quantity of inspections, the magnitudes of fines for noncompliance, the
quantify of information a firm must disclose, and so on. We will also refer to
"regulatory expenditure," which is the cost to a firm of complying with a
regulation.
A. Regulatory Suspension as Stimulus
Regulations are like corporate taxes, and suspending regulations should
stimulate economic activity just as would a cut in the corporate tax rate. 39 U.S.
GDP was almost $18 trillion in 2015, and automatic stabilizers averaged $285
billion from 2012 to 2014. Measured against these baselines, it might seem
unlikely that regulatory adjustments or suspensions could significantly affect
the economy. But the costs imposed by regulation can in fact be quite high. In a
2013 report, the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") estimated that the
economically significant rules promulgated over the prior decade (from 2003 to

36.
See Mathias Dolls, Clemens Fuest & Andreas Peichl, Automatic Stabilizers and
Economic Crisis. US vs. Europe (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16275, 2010),
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6275.

37.

See id.

38.

See Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, The Significance of Federal Taxes as

Automatic Stabilizers, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 38 (2000).
39.
See Alexander Ljungqvist & Michael Smolyansky, To Cut or Not To Cut? (Feb. 8,
2016) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing effects of corporate tax cuts and increases).
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2013) imposed total annual costs of roughly $85 billion in 2010 dollars.4 A
similar report produced in 2001 estimated the total annual costs of regulations
promulgated between 1987 and 2000 at $92 billion in 1996 dollars, or roughly
$121 billion in 2010 dollars. 41 Based on this accounting, the regulations
promulgated from 1987 through 2013 imposed more than $200 billion in yearly
costs. This figure does not include the many regulations with economic impact
of less than $100 million, which are not classified as "economically
significant." It also does not include the many significant regulations from
before 1987. To offer just two examples of under-counting: the Clean Air Act
was passed in 1963, and the Clean Water Act was passed in 1972. Those laws
led to substantial numbers of regulations in the period before 1987.42
All of this is to say that regulations can impose meaningful economic
costs on the economy, within approximately an order of magnitude of existing
automatic stabilizers. Repealing or suspending regulations during an economic
downturn could stimulate the macro economy. However, we do not want to
overstate the case. It is certainly not the case that all of these regulations are
good candidates for suspension, even during the worst economic downturns.
Accordingly, the cost savings from countercyclical regulation will likely be
substantially lower than the numbers we reported in the paragraph above. Our
point is that regulatory suspensions could generate cost savings within an order
of magnitude of automatic fiscal stabilizers. This makes them worth
considering.
Not all regulations are created equal for purposes of suspension or repeal
during macroeconomic downturns. The ideal regulatory cut involves a
regulation that is prospective, involving cost savings that will be permanent
rather than temporary, where the firm uses the savings in a stimulative way,
where the regulatory expenditure will not stimulate the economy, and where
suspending the regulation will not result in a net loss to social welfare.
Regulatory cuts that do not satisfy these conditions are poor candidates for
suspension.
Consider by way of illustration a generic environmental regulation that
requires a factory to reduce pollution. Imagine that the regulation requires the

40.
See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, 2014 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL,
(2014),
11
ENTITIES
TRIBAL
AND

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2014_cb/draft2014_cost-benefitreport-

updated.pdf.
41.
See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, MAKING SENSE OF REGULATION: 2001
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON
(2001)
ENTITIES
AND
TRIBAL
LOCAL,
STATE,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/costbenefitreport.pdf.
42.
For instance, one retrospective study found that regulations promulgated as a

result of the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Acts cost approximately $500 billion dollars between 1970 and
-

1990. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO 1990

RETROSPECTIVE STUDY, ES-8 (1997), https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/benefits-and-costsclean-air-act-I 970-1990-retrospective-study.
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factory to install a scrubber at time 1 at fixed cost F and maintain the scrubber
indefinitely beginning at time 2 at variable cost V per period. A recession
strikes at time t > 1. The agency may suspend the regulation during this time
period in order to stimulate the economy. Clearly, by suspending the regulation,
the agency does not save the firm F, but only V. In general, a regulatory
suspension or "cut" acts as a stimulus only to the extent that prospective
regulatory costs are high; sunk costs are irrelevant. 43 This is the first dimension
of interest.
A second important issue is whether the savings to the firm will be
permanent or only temporary. The savings that the firm realizes from not
having to maintain the scrubber, V, are permanent. There is no future period in
which the firm will be forced to "make up" for the maintenance that it failed to
perform during the period of regulatory suspension. The firm is at liberty to
spend Von some other project, such as increased dividends or hiring additional
workers. By contrast, imagine that the firm decides to expand its operations and
build a second factory during the period of regulatory suspension. At first
glance, it might appear that the firm will also save F, the cost of installing a
new scrubber, because the regulation requiring the scrubber has been
suspended. But this is not really the case. At some point in the future, when the
macroeconomic state of the economy improves, the regulation will be
reinstated and the firm will be forced to pay F to install the scrubber after all.
The firm's savings are only temporary. It is saving the time value of F: the
difference between paying F now and paying it at a later date, which is some
fraction of F that depends on the prevailing interest rate.4 Regulatory cuts that
involve permanent savings to firms will produce greater stimulative effects than
45
cuts that involve only temporary savings.
It is also possible that firms will anticipate the government over-regulating
to "catch up" after periods of regulatory suspension. For instance, if the EPA
suspends a mercury regulation during a downturn, it might impose an
especially stringent form of regulation once normal economic times resume in
order to eliminate the "extra" mercury that was emitted during the suspension.
If firms anticipate over-regulation, they may increase their savings in order to

43.
Except perhaps if a firm can anticipate the regulatory suspension during a
recession, in which case it may be able to save a portion of a rainy-day fund that it holds in order to
protect itself from the adverse effects of a recession.
44.
If macroeconomic conditions are poor, it is likely that interest rates are low, and so
the time value of F may be small.
45.
There is an analogy to fiscal stimulus more generally. Government spending or tax
cuts during a recession must eventually be paid for with tax increases at a later date. As we explained
above, some economists believe that firms and individuals will rationally anticipate these future tax
increases and will not increase spending during the downturn, defeating the purpose of the stimulus.
There is debate over whether individuals and firms will actually behave in this fashion, as we note.
Regardless of how likely it is that individuals and firms will incorporate expectations of future higher
taxes, we suspect it is even more likely that a firm, when deciding whether to invest during an economic
downturn, will take into account the fact that it must bear a fixed cost F to install a scrubber once the
downturn ends.
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pay for future regulation rather than increasing production or hiring more
workers. This is analogous to the behavior predicted by the theory of Ricardian
equivalence. 46 Of course, agencies should not over-regulate in the wake of
regulatory suspensions; they should return to the optimal level of regulation.
Any "extra" pollution that was released during a period of regulatory
suspension is a sunk cost. In addition, increasing the level of regulation
following a suspension would typically require a new notice-and-comment
rulemaking proceeding, which is costly for an agency. For these reasons, we
think it is unlikely that firms will anticipate future over-regulation.
A third factor is how the firm uses the money that it saves, V. There are
numerous possibilities. The firm might transfer V to shareholders in the form of
dividends; retain or "save" V for future projects; or use V to expand production
by, for example, hiring workers and buying inputs. Under standard
macroeconomic theory, the regulatory cut will not serve as a stimulus if the
firm saves V. The regulatory cut might stimulate the economy if V is returned
to shareholders, but the stimulus is likely to be limited or nil because
shareholders are typically wealthy and unlikely to spend much of their savings.
The best case for stimulus occurs in the third case. If the firm buys inputs, it
will reduce inventories held by other firms; if it hires workers (or pays its
workers more), the workers will in turn buy goods, reducing inventories as
well. But it may be doubtful that a firm will expand production in the middle of
a recession. The best case for stimulus arises if the firm occupies a sector of the
economy that has not been affected by the general downturn.
A fourth issue is whether the regulatory compliance action independently
stimulates the economy. Imagine a pollution regulation that limits the quantity
of pollutants that a factory may emit into neighboring bodies of water. As long
as that regulation is in effect, the firm could comply with it in two ways: by
cutting production or by installing water filtration devices and hiring workers to
operate those devices in order to capture pollutants before they escape the
premises. This means that if the regulator suspends the regulation, the
stimulative effect will depend on how the firm complied with the regulation. If
the firm complied with the regulation by cutting production, then suspension of
the regulation may cause the firm to expand production, in which case it will
hire workers and stimulate the economy. But if the firm complied with the
regulation by installing and operating filtration equipment, then suspension of
the regulation may cause layoffs of the workers who had run the filtration
system, or layoffs at the firm that produces the filtration system. Accordingly,
Yair Listokin suggests that certain types of regulation will typically be
stimulative, and that regulation can be tailored to be more stimulative if
regulations are written to require capital expenditures in purchasing and

46.

940 (1979).
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installing equipment. 47 On the other hand, much of the macroeconomic
literature on environmental regulation suggests that regulation will usually
dampen economic activity, at least in the longer term.48
It will be difficult for an agency to determine the macroeconomic effects
of its regulations with any precision. However, an agency can likely obtain
some purchase on this question from its own estimate of the overall
employment effects of a regulation. Agencies are usually required to calculate
the expected employment effects of their regulations, even if they do not
incorporate these figures into the cost-benefit analysis. 49 The agencies'
calculations include the jobs created when regulation requires firms to purchase
and install additional equipment. If a regulation is expected to lead to job gains,
as is the case with some regulations, then the regulation likely has a stimulative
effect.50 If the regulation is expected to lead to job losses, then the economic
drag produced by the regulation likely exceeds any stimulative effect generated
by compliance.
The fifth issue is whether suspending the regulation will lead to excessive
social harm. Regulations typically generate net benefits, often by saving lives
or preventing harms to health. If a regulation is suspended during a downturn,
the net benefit is lost. Nor can the net benefit be recovered if the government
enhances the regulation during a boom. If the agency has regulated properly,
the regulation should already be maximizing benefits net of costs. Enhancing
the regulation during a boom would represent over-regulation and reduce the
net social benefits. Consider, for example, a water pollution regulation that is
likely to save some number of lives per year at a value of $100 million. If the
regulation is suspended during a one-year recession, the $100 million benefit
(in the form of lives saved) is lost and cannot be recovered. As a general
matter, it makes no sense to suspend regulations that generate net benefits. If a
regulation is saving lives at reasonable cost, it should be maintained. However,
an economic downturn raises the unemployment costs generated by regulation
by making it harder for workers who lose their jobs to find new ones.
Accordingly, the value of stimulating the economy by relaxing the regulation
could conceivably exceed the $100 million benefit that would be lost if the
regulation were relaxed.
This means that when an agency incorporates macroeconomic
considerations into a regulation, it will need to add a new input to its CBA.
Currently, agencies disregard unemployment costs, but they do make
predictions about the employment effect of a regulation. To take a simple case,
suppose that an agency considers issuing a regulation during a recession. It
47.
48.
49.

See Listokin, supra note 2.
For details, see sources cited in supranote 6.
Masur & Posner, Regulation and Unemployment, supranote 5.

50.

See id.

51.
See Jonathan Masur & Eric A. Posner, UnquantifiedBenefits and the Problem of
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 7 (2017).
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should fold the unemployment analysis into the CBA by monetizing the cost of
unemployment (or benefit, if the regulation will reduce unemployment). 52 It
should also use the relevant multiplier to predict and monetize the negative
effect (or positive) effect of the regulation on economic output.53 To ensure
uniformity among agencies, the agency should use a multiplier supplied by
OIRA or another central agency (like the Fed) rather than calculate the
multiplier itself.
A more complicated case arises when an agency designs a regulation that
it expects to last through many cycles. The agency must predict the effect of the
regulation on unemployment and hence economic output for the booms and the
busts-or explicitly design a regulation whose strictness various with the
business cycle. In both cases, at least in principle, it can make predictions about
business cycles, use the multiplier, and regulate accordingly. It is not clear how
practical this is in the current state of macroeconomic knowledge.
Let us consider a real-world example. A 1998 EPA regulation setting
effluent guidelines for pulp and paper manufacturing was expected to produce
$159.5 million in net benefits (not including unemployment costs) but also led
to the loss of 5,711 jobs.54 This regulation required manufacturers to switch
from one type of chemical used in pulp and paper processing to a different,
safer, but more expensive chemical. Suspension of this regulation would thus
enable the firm to avoid incurring these extra costs. Instead, the firm would
(presumably) retain the workers and continue with production. The workers
would spend their savings, in line with the multiplier effect. It is also
theoretically possible that switching to the more expensive chemical could also
have a multiplier effect: the firm that sells the expensive chemical will hire
workers as demand for its product increases. To determine whether a regulatory
suspension would stimulate the economy, the regulator would need to net out
these effects-taking into account the possibility that production of the
expensive type of chemical might employ more workers than production of the
other type of chemical-so that any possible loss in the regulated firm's
workforce would be offset or partly offset by a net increase in employment by
chemical suppliers. If the regulator's own job loss figures are to be believed,
then suspension would on net produce a desirable macroeconomic effect. The
question then is whether these gains exceed the cost to society from the
pollution that regulation would have eliminated. If the job loss figures are
accurate-and if the economy is in recession and interest rates are at or near the
zero bound-then they may.

52.
This is advocated by Masur & Posner, supra note 5.
A regulation imposes both costs and benefits on the economy. To calculate the
53.
multiplier effect, the regulator must estimate the net revenue effect of the regulatory cut at the time of
interest. For example, a regulatory cut may save the firm $100 today while increasing harms in the
future. The $100 savings is the equivalent of a $100 corporate tax cut, and should be subject to the same
multiplier as the tax cut would be.
See Masur & Posner, supra note 5, at 598.
54.
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The analysis changes once the regulation is in force. Suppose that the
industry already uses the new the chemical because of an earlier-enacted
regulation. A recession strikes. Should the EPA now suspend the regulation?
The difference now is that many of the costs of complying with the regulation
are sunk. If the firm has purchased new machinery that is only compatible with
the expensive chemical, it may not return to the old chemical even if the EPA
suspends the regulation. But it is also possible that regulatory expenditures are
almost entirely variable. The regulator would need to take into account these
factors when deciding whether to suspend an existing regulation or delay a
regulation in the first place.
B. Some Applications
We have so far used environmental regulations to illustrate our arguments.
Here, we address other types of regulations that further illustrate how a
regulatory stimulus might take place.
Workplace safety. OSHA requires firms to maintain workplace safety by
installing safety devices, training workers, adjusting the production process so
as to minimize toxic inputs, and so on.55 Like environmental regulations,
workplace safety regulations can cause firms to cut back on production or hire
additional workers. In the abstract, then, it is unclear whether a regulatory
suspension would have a stimulative or depressive effect. However, we can
imagine a setting where it would be prudent for OSHA to delay new safety
regulations because of a recession. During a recession, firms normally cut back
production because of excess inventories. A firm that is in the process of
cutting back on production would probably be reluctant to purchase new safety
equipment when the alternative is to lay off a few more people than it otherwise
would. The case for a regulatory suspension, to be sure, is weaker to the extent
that the regulation would produce significant health and safety benefits for
workers at low cost to firms.
Consumer product safety (including financial products). Numerous
regulators try to protect consumers from defective products, including risky
56
financial products. Usually, if a product is found to be dangerous or risky, the
government recalls it or orders firms to correct defects. It seems doubtful that
these actions would have macroeconomic effects, except perhaps in extreme
circumstances, such as the recall of millions of cars. In the latter case, the cost
will most likely fall on the firm, and the analysis is the same as in the
workplace and environment cases. But at least in principle aggressive types of
consumer product regulation could raise prices without creating sufficient
55.
See
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
LABOR,
TOP
TEN
STANDARDS
(2016),
https://www.osha.gov/Top_TenStandards.html.
56.
See U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
AND
MAJOR
SECURITIES
LAWS
(2017),
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/secrulesregs.htm.

873

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 34, 2017

offsetting quality improvements, which would suppress demand, exacerbating a
recession. In such cases, an argument could be made for suspending the
regulation. Another interesting case concerns financial products. A crackdown
on risky financial products during a recession, when credit is tight, could
worsen the recession. During the financial crisis of 2007-08, financial
regulators struggled with just this problem. They sought to crack down on risky
57
mortgages just when people depended on such mortgages to refinance.
Transportation safety. A panoply of federal and state agencies, including
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Federal Aviation
Administration, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the Federal
Railroad Administration are charged with regulating the safety of passenger
58
These regulations include requirements that
and cargo transport.
transportation companies install certain types of safety equipment; that they
provide training; and that they limit the number of hours that employees
operate vehicles. Some of the costs involved in these regulations will be sunk: a
firm cannot easily uninstall safety equipment from a railroad or airplane, nor
would it want to. But others will be variable: firms could scale back the training
they provide or alter how they schedule employees for work, steps that would
reduce the firm's operating costs. Lower transportation operating costs would
then permit other manufacturers to move goods and raw materials at lower cost,
which would reduce prices for consumers and lead to increased spending. This
in turn would reduce inventories and possibly lead manufacturers to expand
operations, increasing employment. There is thus a case for suspending some
types of transportation regulations during downturns.
Food and drugs. Before a firm can market a food or pharmaceutical drug
to the public, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") requires that the firm
demonstrate that the food or (especially) drug is safe to consume. 59 For drugs,
the clinical tests required to demonstrate safety can cost firms hundreds of
millions of dollars and delay the drug's market entrance for years.so The
delayed market arrival of the drug acts as an economic drag; consumers who
would wish to purchase the drug cannot access it, and the pharmaceutical firm
has no reason to begin production. On the other hand, the clinical testing itself
has stimulative effects; it requires that the pharmaceutical firm hire employees
to run the trials, and there are often payments made to study participants. It is

See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL
57.
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, AND NATIONAL CREDIT UNION
(2007),
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ADMINISTRATION,

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20070629al.pdf.
58.

See U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, TRANSPORTATION SAFETY REGULATION IN

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (2016), https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportationpolicy/transportation-safety-regulation-united-states-government.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, WHAT DOES FDA REGULATE? (2017),
59.
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60.

See Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of
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likely that the overall macroeconomic effects of FDA regulation are negative,
however, and there is a case for relaxing them during recessions. At any given
moment there are numerous drugs in the regulatory pipeline, and thus
suspending FDA regulations could immediately allow additional drugs to enter
the consumer market. Firms could then measure the effects of those drugs on
the individuals who take them, obviating any further clinical testing and
making the cost savings permanent.
Immigration. Immigration regulations increase the cost of production for
firms by raising the cost of using the labor of migrant workers. Regulatory
suspension thus would reduce costs, producing a possible stimulative effect
akin to suspension of environmental and workplace regulations. But there is a
twist. When immigration regulations are weakened, firms are given an
incentive to switch from domestic labor to foreign labor. From a domestic
macroeconomic perspective, it may be preferable for firms to use domestic
labor. The reason is that foreign workers send money overseas as remittances,
which means that less money is spent in the short term to draw down domestic
inventories. It is possible, then, that immigration regulations should be
strengthened, rather than weakened, during recessions.
Market regulation. Numerous agencies engage in market regulation, by
which we mean antitrust-style regulation designed to enhance competition. The
Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission have general
jurisdiction over anti-competitive behavior.61 Other agencies, like the Surface
Transportation Board ("STB"), guard against anti-competitive behavior in
specific industries, like (in the case of the STB) railroads.62 There may be
reasons for regulators to adjust their behavior during recessions.63 A recession
might be a bad time to break up a monopolist, for example, because the costs to
the firm and hence to its consumers occur in the short term, possibly
exacerbating the recession. On the other hand, regulators should feel free to
block anticompetitive mergers during a recession since the act of blocking the
merger will not impose any costs on the firm, other than to deprive it of market
power. 64
Employment law. Many economists believe that employment regulations
create "rigidities" in the labor market that prolong recessions.65 For example,
61.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE ENFORCERS (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers.

62.

See 49 U.S.C. § 10,706 (2012).

63.
It has been argued, for example, that the much-derided National Industrial
Recovery Act, a New Deal statute that allowed manufacturers and workers to collude on prices and
wages, helped increase output during the Great Depression by stimulating demand. See Gauti
B. Eggertsson, Was the New Deal Contractionary?,102 AM. ECON. REV. 524 (2012).
For some suggestive evidence that the Obama administration cut back on antitrust
64.
enforcement during the Great Recession, see Daniel A. Crane, Did We Avoid Historical Failuresof
Antitrust Enforcement During the 2008-09 Financial Crisis? (Law & Economics Working Papers 3,

2010).
65.
See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al., Labor and Employment Law and Economics
12 (2009); Richard B. Freeman, Labour Market Institutions Without Blinders: The Debate over

875

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 34, 2017

regulations that require employers to show cause before firing employees,
compensate employees who are laid off, and give notice to employees before
laying them off all increase the cost of reducing the workforce in response to
reduction in demand for the employer's products. As a consequence, when a
recession strikes, employers cannot adapt flexibly. In anticipation of this
constraint, employers hire fewer workers than they would otherwise,
contributing to structural unemployment. The unemployed-but-otherwiseproductive labor is a social cost.
What this means is that when the government considers regulations that
protect workers, it must take into account the structural or macroeconomic cost,
as well as the immediate benefits and costs. Imagine, for example, that the
government is considering whether to issue a regulation that requires employers
to give one month's notice before laying off workers. From a microeconomic
standpoint, the regulation increases the cost of labor by forcing the employer to
retain a worker after it learns that the worker's productivity is less than his
salary. The benefit of the regulation for the worker is that he knows that if he is
laid off, he will have a month to find a new job before losing his salary, which
enables him to save less so as to protect himself from a short-term income
shock from a surprise layoff. Of course, it may be unlikely that such a
regulation would be net beneficial given that the parties could bargain for it
privately if the employer values the insurance more than it costs the employer,
but we put this qualification aside. 6
The regulator should also try to take into account the macroeconomic
effect of this regulation. The negative effect of the regulation is that it will
reduce the speed with which workers are moved from lower-value to highervalue jobs. Under this regulation, the employer is given an incentive to retain
the worker for the extra month rather than lay him off because, given the
regulatory requirement, retention of the worker is close to free. As a result,
there is delay before the worker finds the time to search for a new job, and in
the meantime his continued retention may block an unemployed worker from
taking his now lower-value job at a lower wage. However, it is also possible
that the regulation would have effects similar to that of automatic stabilizers:
the worker retains his wage for an additional month, which he can use to buy
things, raising aggregate demand. The problem is that his wage comes at the
expense of the employer or other employees, so the effect may be null rather
than stimulative.
Regulators have not incorporated these macroeconomic costs in CBAs.
When President Obama ordered the Department of Labor to raise the minimum
wage for the employees of federal contractors, the DOL dutifully performed a

Flexibility and Labour Market Performance, 19 INT'L ECON. J. 129 (2005); Olivier J. Blanchard,
Florence Jaumotte & Prakash Loungani, Labor Market Policies and IMF Advice in Advanced
Economies Duringthe Great Recession, 3 IZA J. LABOR POLICY (2014).
66.
See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000).
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cost-benefit analysis that found that the benefits of the regulation exceeded the
costs.67 While the agency's major point seems to be that the regulation is
mainly a transfer from taxpayers to workers, and thus a wash from a CBA
perspective, it also argues that the regulation would produce a variety of other
benefits-including boosting worker morale, thereby raising productivity and
reducing turnover. For our purposes, the agency's most interesting claim is that
"a higher minimum wage for low-wage workers, who tend to spend a larger
fraction of their earnings, can increase demand for goods and services which, in
turn, would boost employment and economic growth." 68 It is true that transfers
to low-income workers can increase aggregate demand. However, the
macroeconomic benefits of such an approach are likely to be largest during a
recession, while this regulation was implemented during a period of moderate
economic growth.
Another point is that the minimum wage is a type of law that may increase
rigidity of the labor market, since it blocks employers from lowering wages
during recessions, forcing them instead to lay off workers. While there are
many other reasons why employers lay off workers rather than reduce wages
during recessions, a minimum wage law could increase their incentives at the
margin. The DOL should have addressed this additional cost when it performed
the CBA.
State and local regulations. Our discussion thus far has mainly concerned
federal regulation, but the same principles could be applied to state and local
regulations as well. A state or locality that went into recession could suspend or
repeal regulations as a means of stimulating the local economy. Countercyclical
regulation is perhaps even more attractive at the state or local level because
states and localities do not have the ability to use monetary policy and in many
cases are constrained by budgetary rules from using fiscal policy as well. In
some circumstances, regulatory policy may be the only viable option. Of
course, state regulatory suspension may primarily have the effect of diverting
economic activity from one state to another, rather than increasing the overall
level of economic activity. State-level action is not the best approach to a
national downturn. But if a more localized recession affects one or several
states but not the nation as a whole, regulatory policy could become a useful
tool.
C. The Case of Capital Requirements
Finally, we briefly discuss here the single example we have found of a
deliberately countercyclical regulatory approach. This example illustrates some
of the reasons for taking macroeconomics seriously in regulation.

67.
68.

See 29 C.F.R. § 10 (2014).
Id.
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Banks and other financial institutions are required to maintain a minimum
ratio of capital to assets under regulations known as capital requirements. 69
Under the traditional "microprudential" approach to bank regulation, capital
regulations are justified by the existence of deposit insurance. Because of the
guarantee supplied by deposit insurance, depositors lend money to banks
without taking into account whether a bank is likely to repay the loan. This
creates moral hazard: banks have an incentive to make risky loans, even loans
with negative net present value, because taxpayers bear the downside while
bank shareholders receive the upside. Bank regulations deter moral hazard in
many ways. Of present interest, capital regulations are designed to force
shareholders to internalize more of the downside if the bank's loans are not
repaid. The larger the equity cushion, the more money the shareholders lose if
the bank cannot repay its creditors and is taken over by bank regulators.
Even before the financial crisis, financial economists worried about the
macroeconomic effects of this approach. 70 The financial crisis shows that these
worries were justified. While the microprudential approach was designed to
ensure that each bank internalized the cost of risky lending, it did not take into
account a bank's incentive to lend in the first place. During an economic
downturn, a bank whose capital ratio falls too low can bring itself back into
regulatory compliance either by raising more capital or by selling assets (that
is, selling loans and/or refusing to originate new loans as old loans are paid
off). But an economic downturn is typically accompanied (or caused) by the
withdrawal of credit from the market. If a bank complies with capital
regulations by reducing the size of its loan portfolio, it will exacerbate the
credit withdrawal. And because raising equity during an economic downturn is
costly, banks will be inclined to do just that. Microprudential regulation is
procyclical-aggravating the macroeconomic harm inherent in business
cycles. 71
"Macroprudential" regulation addresses this problem by building a
countercyclical element into the regulation. Among the many ways of doing
this, a simple approach is to increase capital requirements during booms and
reduce them during recessions. This will cause banks, against the
microprudential baseline, to reduce lending during booms and to increase
lending during recessions. Macroprudential regulation in this way reinforces,
rather than contradicts, the efforts of the central bank to manage the business
cycle by adjusting market interest rates.

69.

In this discussion, we follow Hanson et al., supranote 7.

70.

See Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, Cyclical Implications of the Basel-II

CapitalStandards, 28 FED. RES. BANK CHI. ECON. PERSP. 18 (2004).
71.
Amitai Aviram has suggested that both corporate fraud prosecutions and the use of
bailouts could have similar procyclical effects. See Amitai Aviram, Counter-Cyclical Enforcement of
CorporateLaw, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2008); Amitai Aviram, Bail-Ins: Cyclical Effects of a Common
Response to FinancialCrises, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1633, 1649-50.

878

Should Regulation Be Countercyclical
The
Basel
Committee
on
Banking
Supervision
introduced
macroprudential regulation in 2010.72 The most important element of this
regulation was a "countercyclical buffer" requirement. 73 National regulatory
authorities were instructed to monitor credit conditions. If a regulator
determines that "credit growth is excessive and is leading to the buildup of
system-wide risk," it will require banks to increase their capital by between 0
and 2.5% of risk-weighted assets.74 When credit conditions normalize, banks
are released from the countercyclical buffer requirement.
Note the effect that the macroprudential approach has on a traditional
cost-benefit analysis. A CBA for a microprudential regulation will ignore
business-cycle effects. Suppose that the CBA implies an optimal capital
regulation of 8%. If, instead, the macroprudential approach is used, the
regulator will incorporate macroeconomic effects into the CBA. This could
imply, for example, that the capital regulation will be 12% during a boom and
4% during a recession.7 5
The Basel example shows that countercyclical regulation is both
conceptually coherent and politically possible. Still, we do yet know whether it
will work as intended, and there are special features of capital regulation that
do not carry over to other types of regulation. The capital regulation in question
is a kind of monetary stimulus rather than a fiscal stimulus, and banks are of
central importance in determining the money supply. For this reason, it is
plausible that countercyclical capital regulation could have desirable
macroeconomic effects. By contrast, the regulations we have discussed are
fiscal in nature, and doubts about the effectiveness of fiscal policy tools are
more pronounced than they are for monetary policy.
D. Is CountercyclicalRegulation Ever an Optimal Policy Instrument?
A possible response to our arguments is that if the government seeks to
counter the business cycle, it should always use tax cuts rather than regulation
because tax cuts are more efficient.76 To understand this argument, imagine that
a regulation is a Pigouvian tax that is optimally set to correct an environmental
externality. A recession strikes. If the government suspends or weakens the
Pigouvian tax in order to reduce unemployment, it will cause harm to people
72.
See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2010).
73.
Jose-Luis Peydro et al., Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital
Buffers and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic ProvisioningExperiments, J. POL.
ECON. (forthcoming) (finding that macroprudential credit policy was effective in smoothing credit
cycles).

74.

Id. at 57-59.
&

75.
See Hanson et al., supra note 7, at 8-9.
76.
In the legal literature, this style of argument is famous from Louis Kaplow
Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Tax System in RedistributingIncome, 23
J. LEGAL STUDIES 667 (1994), who made an analogous argument that "legal rules" should never be used
to redistribute wealth because tax-and-transfer redistribution is more efficient.
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who benefit from the environmental amenity, while it is very unlikely that the
tax savings will be used entirely for consumption, as is necessary for the
maximum macroeconomic benefit. By contrast, if the government cuts taxes (or
engages in any other type of monetary transfer), it can both avoid the
environmental harm and direct the money to those people who are most likely
to spend it, maximizing the macroeconomic benefit. Or perhaps
macroeconomic stabilization should be left entirely to the Fed to manage using
monetary policy. Agencies should regulate efficiently; the Fed should act to
stabilize the labor market; and Congress can then tax and transfer to achieve
distributional goals.
While this argument is superficially appealing, it ignores the real-world
context of interest to us. There are often serious political and practical limits on
using tax cuts and spending increases to stimulate the economy. The political
constraint is that the political system is frequently gridlocked and unable to
engage in fiscal policy, whether through tax cuts or spending. Even if fiscal
policy is possible, politics may greatly reduce its effectiveness. For instance, it
may be that the only type of fiscal policy that can pass Congress is a tax cut
targeted mainly at wealthier individuals, who are less likely to spend the money
than poorer people would.n Traditional monetary policy can also cease to be
effective during a recession when interest rates are near the zero lower bound
and the Fed cannot lower them further. These constraints are largely
responsible for the aggressive efforts by the Fed and other central banks to use
experimental forms of monetary policy to stimulate the economy. It may also
justify the use of fiscal policy by the executive branch in the form of regulatory
suspensions and moratoria. The broader point is that fiscal and monetary
stimulus are not mutually exclusive; they can (and often do) exist side-by-side.
The same is true for countercyclical regulation.
III. Legal and Institutional Questions
How should countercyclical regulatory policy be implemented? And who
should be charged with its implementation? In this final Part, we discuss these
issues of legal and institutional design.
A. Policy Mechanisms and Legal Authority
One critical question is which institutions should be charged with
effecting countercyclical regulatory policy and what legal tools they should
employ. We can imagine several different approaches:

77.
78.

Government

The 2003 Bush tax cuts were criticized on this ground.
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1. The agency suspends or weakens the regulation during a downturn. The
EPA, for example, promulgates a regulation suspending the
requirement that factories be required to operate scrubbers.
This option relies upon the agency's standard rulemaking authority and
thus falls well within the bounds of what agencies are normally permitted to do.
It should be generally permitted, except in cases when a statute explicitly states
that an agency must take some type of regulatory action. 79 Those cases are not
especially rare; for instance, the Clean Air Act states that the EPA "shall
promulgate regulations establishing emissions standards" for a variety of
hazardous air pollutants.so This type of language-particularly the word
"shall"-has been held to require agency action. A temporary suspension of
an existing regulation might nonetheless be lawful, if the suspension is only
temporary. The agency could argue that it has fulfilled its duty to promulgate
regulations if its regulations remain in force at most (if not all) times. The
agency would receive Chevron deference with respect to this type of claim, and
that might be enough to shield its actions.
2. The agency maintains the regulation but suspends enforcement. The
EPA announces that it will stop inspections or other enforcement
actions. In other contexts, this is known as regulatory forbearance.82
Here, too, in exercising its prosecutorial discretion the agency is acting
well within the boundaries of typical authority.83 Agencies have employed
regulatory forbearance on numerous occasions, and their actions have typically
been sanctioned by the courts.84 Unlike the issue of regulation in the first
instance, courts have rarely held that agencies must enforce their own
regulations to the utmost degree; to do so would violate long-standing norms of
prosecutorial discretion.

79.

§ 706(1)

See Kathryn A. Watts, Regulatory Moratoria, 61 DuKE L.J. 1883 (2012); 5 U.S.C.

(2012).

80.
81.
82.
THE S&L DEBACLE:
83.
L. REv. 119 (2015).
84.

42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1) (2012).
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
This was famously used (to ill effect) in the S&L crisis. See LAWRENCE WHITE,
PUBLIC LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION (1991).
See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Towarda PigouvianState, 164 U. PENN
See Daniel T. Deacon, AdministrativeForbearance,125 YALE L.J. 1548 (2016).
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3. A centralized administrator, such as the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA"), is given the power to suspend or
weaken regulations during downturns.
The central legal issue is the extent to which non-agency actors wield
power, or may be permitted to wield power, over the administrative state. Most
organic agency statutes explicitly vest power in the agency or its head, while
others name the president alongside the agency head or refer more generally to
Some scholars have taken this to mean that the
the executive branch.
president can direct agencies to act via executive order only when the statute
explicitly confers authority on the president.87 Others have argued that the
president has more general authority to direct the operations of the
administrative state.88 In practice, the issue may be irrelevant, at least when it
comes to executive-branch agencies such as the EPA or Department of
Transportation. The president has unquestioned authority to fire the heads of
these agencies and could always move to transfer power to a more pliant
interim agency head. We are not aware of any examples of agency heads
openly defying the president.
This means that under current law, the president could direct an agency to
promulgate a new regulation suspending or weakening an existing regulation.
The president could also direct the agency to refrain from enforcing the
regulation for a period of time. OIRA has no formal powers of its own, but
using an executive order the president could confer authority on OIRA to issue
the same type of directive. The picture is slightly more complicated if the
president intends for a non-executive branch actor such as the Fed to possess
similar authority. For that type of action, a statute would likely be required.
4. The agency refrains from issuing new regulations during the downturn.
Regulations are delayed until economic conditions improve.
Here, again, the agency would simply refrain from using its regulatory
authority. The issues are the same as in option #1.

OIRA is a unit of the Office of Management and Budget charged with reviewing
85.
agency regulations before they are promulgated. See About OIRA, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET (last visited
Sept. 12, 2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/oira/about.
86.
See Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws,

106 COLUM. L. REv. 263 (2006).
87.
See id.
88.
See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
For a useful overview of this debate, see Watts, supra note 79.
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5. The agency issues regulations whose force depends on economic
conditions. The EPA announces in the initial scrubber regulation that
requirements are limited during downturns.
This is the regulatory version of an automatic stabilizer. So far as we can
determine, there is no law that would prevent agencies from promulgating
regulations whose force depends upon external conditions, although we hasten
to add that there is very little law on the subject.8 There is no statute that
explicitly addresses whether or not an agency may promulgate a regulation that
relies upon an external trigger of some sort and no reported cases evaluating the
practice. However, there are examples of regulations, promulgated under a
number of different statutes, which automatically spring into force or suspend
based upon some external triggering event. For instance, the Department of
Labor has promulgated regulations that automatically extend eligibility for
unemployment benefits in a state when that state's unemployment rate hits 5%
or when the state satisfies other criteria. 91 There are also many regulations that
can be suspended or reinstated at the discretion of the executive. For instance,
when the president or a state governor declares a state of emergency, that
declaration automatically suspends a wide range of regulations, including rules
governing automobile and transportation safety. 92
States have promulgated regulations containing automatic triggers as well.
For instance, regulations issued by the EPA require the states to devise their
own plans to reduce greenhouse gas regulations. In the course of complying
with these requirements, seven states issued regulations that automatically
suspend if a court of appeals or the U.S. Supreme Court strikes down the
underlying EPA regulation.93 The EPA, which has the authority to approve or
disapprove of state plans, has permitted states to use these automatic triggers. 94
There are no reported cases testing such provisions, and so it is hard to assess
their legality with any confidence. But the fact that agencies are allowed to use
triggering provisions regularly and without comment indicates that a trigger
based on external economic conditions would likely be viewed as permissible.
Automatic triggers are sometimes built into statutes. For instance, the
EPA's duty to regulate is triggered when the agency finds that a particular
pollutant "endanger[s] public health or welfare." 95 There are other statutes that
include automatic triggers that can be activated at the discretion of an agency
89.
See Watts, supra note 79.
90.
See Jonathan S. Masur, QuadraticVoting as an Input to Cost-Benefit Analysis, 170
PUBLIC CHOICE 177 (2017).

91.
92.
93.
Tennessee:

20 C.F.R. §§ 615.11-13.
See 49 C.F.R. § 390.23(a)(1)(i).
E.g., Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1200-03-09-02.

94.
See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans;
Prevention of Significant Deterioration; Greenhouse Gases-Automatic Rescission

Provisions, 77 Fed. Reg. 12,484 (2012).
95.
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head-a combination of the automatic triggers described here and the
discretionary approach we described in option #2 above. For instance, the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program only permits able-bodied adults
without dependents who are not working to receive food stamps for three
months in any thirty-six-month period.96 However, upon request from a state
agency, the Secretary of Agriculture may waive the work requirement for
individuals living in localities where the unemployment rate is greater than
10%. 97

Some types of regulatory mechanisms will also function as automatic
stabilizers, even if they are not phrased in those terms. Consider, for instance, a
statute or regulation that uses cap and trade to control pollution. Any firm that
wishes to emit a pollutant subject to the cap must purchase emissions permits
on the open market that permit it to do so. The sulfur dioxide program
implemented by the EPA in the 1990s to reduce acid rain is one such
program,98 and there have been proposals to curb greenhouse gas emissions
using cap and trade as well. 99 When the economy is booming, emissions of
airborne pollutants (including sulfur dioxide and greenhouse gases) will
naturally increase. This will increase the demand for emissions permits, raising
the price at which the permits are traded, and thus acting as a brake on
economic activity. When economic conditions are poor, emissions will
naturally decrease, lowering the price of emissions permits and providing a
stimulus to polluting firms. If firms are prohibited from using explicit
automatic stabilizers in regulations, they still might select regulatory
mechanisms that effectively function as automatic stabilizers.
B. Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages
The approaches we describe in the preceding section differ along several
important dimensions. In this section, we analyze the options along four of
those dimensions: legal significance, the speed with which it could be
implemented, whether the option involves ex ante or ex post discretion, and the
identity of the policymaker charged with implementing the regulatory
suspension.

96.
97.
98.

7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(2) (2012).
7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(4).
42 U.S.C. § 7651.

See Daniel A. Lashof et al., Closing The Power Plant CarbonPollution Loophole:
99.
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1. Legal Significance
If an agency suspends a regulation (or the regulation is automatically
suspended), then a regulated party that ceases compliance has violated no legal
rule. On the other hand, if an agency or OIRA simply announces that it will not
enforce the regulation (options #2 and #3), regulated parties that cease
compliance will have violated the law, even if they are not prosecuted. There
may be no practical difference between suspension and non-enforcement in the
immediate term, but that will not necessarily remain the case. At any given
moment, the agency could reverse its earlier decision and begin enforcing the
rule. Even if the agency has attempted to commit itself in the most unequivocal
terms, that commitment cannot legally bind the agency in the future. Not only
could an agency "reinstate" the regulation at a moment's notice, it could also
prosecute regulated parties for past violations during the period when
enforcement was suspended. 1o There are reasons to believe that agencies will
shy away from such behavior, particularly reputational ones: if the agency
wants non-enforcement to have any effect, it must cultivate a reputation for
reliability. That consideration loses some of its force across administrations,
however. For instance, one could imagine the Bush EPA suspending
regulations in 2008, only for the Obama EPA to reinstate them in 2009 on the
grounds that the suspension was not cost-benefit justified. Rational firms might
decide not to take action in response to enforcement suspensions if the agency
is not credible.
In addition, violations of certain statutes and regulations carry collateral
penalties. For instance, a firm that violates the Clean Air Act or regulations
issued under the Act is barred from contracting with the government.10 1
Violation of an existing regulation would trigger this bar even if the EPA has
announced that it will not enforce the regulation. Of course, the relevant
agencies could announce that they will not enforce the contracting ban either,
but this may involve additional delay and complication. Furthermore, a firm
that violates the Clean Air Act may wish to contract with the Department of
Defense, but the EPA cannot force the Department of Defense to suspend its
enforcement of the anti-contracting provisions. (This highlights the need for
centralization and coordination of regulatory stabilization policy, an issue we
discuss at greater length below.) Some regulations also create private rights of
action, and a promise by the agency not to enforce them could not prevent
private parties from doing the same. Accordingly, there is value to regulatory
suspensions that carry legal force, despite the ease and simplicity of simply
announcing a suspension of enforcement.

100.
Cf William M. Ejzak, Note, Plea Bargains and Nonprosecution Agreements:
What Interests Should Be Protected When Prosecutors Renege?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 107, 130-31
(describing a line of cases in which prosecutors have been allowed to renege on non-prosecution
agreements).

101.

Masur & Posner, supra note 83; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (2012).
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2. Speed
Consider, for instance, the first option we described above-agency
suspension of a regulation. Under current law, an agency can only suspend or
alter its own regulation, which was originally promulgated using notice-andcomment rulemaking, if it again employs notice-and-comment rulemaking. The
only potential exception is if the agency can establish that "good cause"
exists,102 in which case the agency can issue an interim final rule (which takes
immediate effect) and follow it with notice-and-comment rulemaking. A severe
economic downturn that necessitates immediate action is the type of situation
that courts have generally viewed as sufficient, although there has never been a
case that raised precisely this question.lo3 Without the requirement of notice
and comment, rulemaking could in theory occur quite quickly but in practice
will still take months (though not years). An agency must still comply with a
variety of legal mandates, such as certifying compliance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act and determining the effect of the rulemaking on small
businesses.

1

By contrast, the agency could announce that it will suspend enforcement
of a regulation (option #2) at any point, with no notice. The President, acting
through an executive-branch administrator such as OIRA, could likely do the
same (option #3).10 Similarly, an agency could of course refrain from
promulgating any new regulations (option #4) with no delay.
The fastest option would be to write regulations that automatically adjust
in accordance with macroeconomic conditions (option #5). These regulations
would behave like automatic stabilizers: they would take effect without the
need for any affirmative steps and without delay. Agencies could include such
automatic stabilizers in future regulations, or they could use notice-andcomment rulemaking to insert automatic stabilization provisions into existing
regulations. These actions would naturally take a significant amount of time; if
agencies were to pursue this route, they should act well in advance of an
economic downturn.
As a normative matter, more speed in countercyclical policy is always
preferred. As we noted above, economic conditions can change rapidly, often
before economic policy has a chance to adapt. This is the reason why
economists who favor activist stimulus policy are most optimistic about
automatic stabilizers, which take effect immediately and seamlessly, and why
they prefer monetary policy interventions (when available) as a first resort over
standard fiscal policy. Like monetary policy, regulatory stimulus acts by
102.

5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2012).

See JARED P. COLE, CONG. RES. SERV., R44356, THE GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION
103.
To NOTICE AND COMMENT RULEMAKING: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION (2016).

E.g., 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521 (2012) (Paperwork Reduction Act); 5 U.S.C. § 601
104.
et seq. (2012) (Regulatory Flexibility Act).
105.
See Kagan, supranote 88; but see Stack, supra note 86.
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lowering costs for businesses. Thus, like monetary policy, it may take six
months for regulatory changes to impact the economy because firms will have
made investment decisions six months in advance. Accordingly, there is an
argument for regulations that contain automatic stabilizers and for agencies to
act quickly to suspend enforcement of regulations, rather than engaging the
cumbersome notice-and-comment process to change those regulations during
downturns.
3. Ex Ante v. Ex Post Discretion
Altering or suspending a regulation (option #1), suspending enforcement
(options #2 and #3), and adjusting the types of regulations promulgated in the
future (option #4) are all exercises of ex post discretion-some administrative
actor makes a policy decision after the economic downturn has occurred.
Option #5, regulations that adjust automatically given macroeconomic
conditions, involves ex ante discretion: the regulator chooses how to implement
policy at the time the regulation is promulgated but takes no further action in
the event of a downturn. It is also possible to imagine a type of mixed approach
in which a regulation adjusts automatically when a policymaker certifies that a
particular condition is present. The Basel III bank regulations, which we
discussed above, serve as the leading example of this approach. Under Basel, if
regulators certify that "credit growth is excessive and is leading to the buildup
of system-wide risk," the regulations automatically adjust to require banks to
hold additional capital. The trigger involves human intervention, but the
regulations are already written to have legal effects once triggered.
There are advantages and disadvantages to these approaches, most of
which will be familiar from the standard literature on rules and standards. Ex
post discretion allows agencies to tailor their responses to the specific details of
an economic downturn, which can be very valuable. For instance, a recession
might take place in one industry or sector while largely sparing others, as was
the case in the 2001 recession (post September 11, 2001) for the airline
transportation sector. 1 0 If unemployment rates rise more dramatically in the
airline industry than elsewhere, regulations that cause unemployment in that
sector will have a more negative effect and should be scaled back further. If
some other industry-power generation, for instance-is comparably
unaffected, then the case for suspending regulations in that sector is weaker. If
regulators' hands are tied because of how the rules were initially written, they
cannot make such fine distinctions. The problem, as with legal rules in general,
is possible over- and under-inclusiveness.

106.
See Harumi Ito & Darin Lee, Assessing the Impact of the September 11'
TerroristAttacks on US. Airline Demand, 57 J. ECON. & Bus. 75 (2005). It is important to note that not
every downturn represents a demand shortfall that policymakers should address. We have in mind
temporary exogenous demand shocks that do not reflect negatively on the fundamentals of an industry.
The effects of 9/11 on the airline industry serve as a paradigmatic example.
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Note that because of the nature of enforcement discretion, agencies only
have the ability to make real-time regulatory adjustments in one direction. They
can relax regulatory requirements quickly and easily, but they cannot
strengthen them. That is, imagine that a Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA") regulation that imposes costs upon the airline industry has been
written to automatically become laxer if the economy enters a recession. A
recession begins, activating the automatic regulatory stabilizers. If this
recession has an especially pronounced effect on the airline industry, regulators
could elect to suspend enforcement to an even greater degree than would occur
automatically, which would further weaken the regulation. However, if the
recession has a smaller-than-average effect on the airline industry, there is no
easy way for the FAA to cancel the automatic stabilizer and restore the
regulation to its full force. Doing so would require new notice-and-comment
rulemaking, which is slow and costly. This implies that when agencies write
automatic stabilizers into their regulations they should err on the side of not
weakening the regulations enough, knowing that the agency can always take
further action if it is warranted by suspending enforcement.
At the same time, there are disadvantages to relying upon ex post agency
discretion to suspend regulations when a downturn occurs. Decision makers
may dither, wasting valuable time while the recession is ongoing. They may
also come under political pressure to act too aggressively or not aggressively
enough. This threat of political pressure is of course one principal reason why
the Federal Reserve was made independent. The stakes for agency regulation
will be lower, but the threat of pressure might nonetheless push agency actions
away from what is optimal.
Accordingly, we believe that the best option might be for agencies to
pursue a mixed approach in which modest automatic stabilizers are
supplemented by discretionary regulatory suspensions when a downturn
actually occurs. This approach would ensure that agencies take some action
automatically and immediately, but it would also permit them to tailor their
efforts to the particular economic conditions at hand.
4. Choice of Policymaker
The majority of the options we discuss above involve the agency itself as
the prime mover. But it is also possible to imagine vesting authority with a
centralized administrator, such as OIRA or even the Federal Reserve. Under
current law, OIRA, even with the full weight of the president's authority behind
it, cannot unilaterally promulgate or suspend regulations.' 07 That requires

107.
See Robert Percival, Presidential Influence Over Administrative Action, 79
FORDHAM L. REv. 2487 (2011). Even though the U.S. administrative state is far more centralized than
that of other nations such as China, see Daniel Abebe & Jonathan S. Masur, InternationalAgreements,
Internal Heterogeneity, and Climate Change: The "Two Chinas" Problem, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 325
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agency action in the form of notice-and-comment rulemaking. But the president
could suspend enforcement of a regulation via executive order, and it is
possible to imagine the president delegating to OIRA the authority for selecting
which regulations to suspend under which circumstances. In addition, agencies
could promulgate regulations that delegate to some other actor-such as
OIRA-the authority to suspend those regulations when conditions are met.108
Congress could also conceivably pass a law allowing the president, OIRA, or
even the Fed to suspend regulations upon a finding that it is warranted by
macroeconomic conditions.
Again, there are advantages and disadvantages to each of these
approaches. Agencies have the most information about their own regulations
and the industries they regulate, and so they will be best-positioned to evaluate
whether suspending a particular targeted regulation will benefit an industry
experiencing a downturn. On the other hand, there is clear value to coordination
and centralization. In some cases, a recession may be so severe that a wide
range of regulations across the administrative state should be suspended; in
other cases, it might be sufficient for some agencies to suspend regulations
while others leave them in force. For instance, if an economic downturn hit the
energy sector, it might make sense for the EPA to suspend regulation of certain
types of fuels or power plants but for the Department of Energy to maintain
energy efficiency regulations at current levels.
It would be best if regulatory action were coordinated with monetary and
fiscal policy. If the Federal Reserve is taking action that will be sufficient to
address a downturn, agencies should stay their hand. The relationship between
fiscal stimulus and agency action can be more complicated. For instance, if a
fiscal stimulus bill includes significant spending on new infrastructure projects,
there is little need for the EPA to relax its environmental rules on concrete
production in order to accomplish the same ends. However, it might be
valuable for the EPA to relax other rules-protection for endangered species;
requirements of environmental impact reports; and so forth-so as to allow the
new infrastructure projects to proceed rapidly. 1 09
Consequently, we believe there is a strong case for vesting primary
responsibility with a central executive-branch actor, such as OIRA. That
policymaker should then consult with individual agencies regarding the details
of their regulations to find suitable candidates for suspension. One mechanism
for implementing this type of policy is for OIRA to scrutinize proposed agency
regulations, as they are being promulgated, to determine whether they include

(2009), it still devolves primary policymaking authority to individual administrative agencies, rather
than vesting it in a centralized administrator.
108.
See Deacon, supra note 84.
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cost-justified automatic stabilizers. This review would take place alongside
OIRA's traditional review of agency cost-benefit analysis. OIRA would thus be
able to coordinate stimulus policy across agencies while relying upon the
agencies themselves for technical evaluation of their own regulations.
C. Economic Triggers
A final question is one of timing: when should agencies deploy regulatory
measures as macroeconomic stimulus? What sort of economic factors should
agencies rely upon when deciding whether to act? This issue is particularly
important when agencies promulgate regulations that include automatic
stabilizers, but it is relevant as well when policymakers must decide ex post
whether to relax or suspend regulation.
Knowing when the country has entered an economic downturn, and
whether that downturn warrants a policy response, is of course an immensely
complicated question. The Federal Open Market Committee relies upon reams
of economic evidence in making such decisions, and we have nothing to add on
that score. Rather, our goal is to identify the particular challenges facing an
agency, which is not likely to have expertise in macroeconomic policy, in
fashioning stimulus policy, particularly when that policy comes in the form of
automatic regulatory stabilizers. Agencies will need simple formulas or
indicators that can be easily embedded in regulations and do not rely upon the
application of substantial macroeconomic expertise to a wide swath of data.
One obvious solution might be to use the unemployment rate, either the
national rate or the rate in the particular industry affected by a given regulation.
After all, the costs of unemployment are the primary rationale for rethinking
the stringency of regulations during a downturn. The problem is that either
unemployment figure can be misleading. Economic weakness in a given
industry might be a sign that advances in technology have made that industry
obsolete, and the economy as a whole might still be booming. It would make no
sense to relax regulations on the manufacture of buggy whips just because
automobiles have taken over the market. As for the overall unemployment rate,
the problem is that it may be difficult to know what constitutes "full
employment" at any given moment in time. If the unemployment rate seems to
be high-say, 6.5%-but the rate of inflation is similarly high, this may be a
sign that the economy is experiencing a boom rather than a downturn.1 10
Agencies could attempt to use some combination of the unemployment rate and
the inflation rate to determine policy, but this begins to verge on the sort of
complex policy decision that is best left to the Federal Reserve.

110.
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Another possibility would be to trigger regulatory stimulus when the
economy goes into recession.111 The problem here is that regulatory action
might come too late to be useful. As we explained above, it may take six
months for countercyclical regulatory policy to affect the economy. If agencies
wait until the economy has entered a recession before acting, regulatory
stimulus could lag the downturn by a year and might arrive only when the
economy has already begun to recover, making it pro-cyclical rather than
countercyclical. 112 Agencies could of course act more quickly-for instance,
after just one quarter of negative growth-but they would run the risk of
responding to a blip in the data, rather than a true downturn. Again, the policy
could turn out to be pro-cyclical if the economy is actually in fine shape.
One final option is to trigger regulatory suspension when the federal funds
rate is very low-at or near 0%. Low interest rates are an indication that the
economy is not performing at full capacity and that inflation is low as well.
Moreover, when interest rates are at the zero lower bound, the Federal
Reserve's policy options are highly constrained. If monetary stimulus is
unavailable, and fiscal stimulus is uncertain because it relies upon the actions
of Congress, regulatory stimulus may be the best remaining option. This
approach effectively allows agencies to piggyback on the expertise of the Fed
in setting rates.' 13 However, if agencies were to adopt this approach, regulatory
stimulus would likely only occur during the most severe economic downturns
and might be unresponsive to typical shallow recessions.
We intend this canvas of the available options to indicate the difficulties
that agencies will face in formulating policy on the basis of macroeconomic
conditions. Agencies will not want to act too late, for fear that the economy will
already have recovered, or too quickly, for fear that there never really was a
significant downturn. They must calibrate their actions despite lacking any
significant macroeconomic expertise. (This highlights the potential value of
transferring authority over regulatory suspensions to the Fed, despite its lack of
expertise in regulatory policy.) In sum, stimulus by regulatory suspension turns
out to be a challenging proposition. A possible conclusion is that the game is
not worth the candle. However, we think that such a conclusion is premature.
The effectiveness of a regulatory suspension for stimulating the economy is an
empirical question. Our goal here is to lay out the major considerations, which
may be used to guide empirical analysis.

111.
There is no single definition of a recession. The press often defines a recession as
two consecutive quarters of negative economic growth, but the National Bureau of Economic Research
("NBER") defines a recession differently. See The NBER 's Business Cycle Dating Procedure.
Frequently Asked Questions, NAT'L BUREAU ECON. RES. (last visited Sept. 12, 2017),
http://www.nber.org/cycles/recessionsfaq.htm.
The Department of Commerce uses the NBER
definition. See Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE (last

visited Sept. 12, 2017), http://www.bea.gov/faq/index.cfm?faq_id-485.
112.
113.

See Mankiw, supranote 11.
See Listokin, supranote 2 (favoring the same approach).
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Conclusion
We are left uncertain whether countercyclical regulation is practical and
wise. It may be too difficult for agencies to adjust regulatory burdens in
response to changing economic conditions, or to design automatic adjustments
that work as they are supposed to. Moreover, the aggregate regulatory burden
may be too small to allow for meaningful stimulus through regulatory
suspensions that are consistent with all the constraints that we discussed earlier.
Yet the question of countercyclical regulation also seems inescapable.
When economists complain that "rigidities" prevent the labor market from
adjusting to a decline in aggregate demand, they are implicitly making a
macroeconomic argument that employment regulations should be adjusted.
Similarly, when policymakers complain that fiscal stimulus is thwarted by
delay-causing environmental and related regulations, they are making a similar
argument about the adverse macroeconomic effect of those regulations. If these
arguments have any validity, then agencies should take them into account when
performing cost-benefit analysis of regulations and addressing questions of
enforcement. If nothing else, we hope that the discussions about the
macroeconomic effects of proposed regulations begin to appear in regulatory
impact analyses.
There is also another debate that has important implications for whether
agencies should take into account the macroeconomic effects of their
regulations. In recent years, economists have been debating the causes of slow
economic growth in the developed world. Robert Gordon argues that the major
source of slow economic growth has been the lack of major technological
innovation.114 On this view, slow economic growth will continue into the
foreseeable future. By contrast, Larry Summers sees the problem as one of
aggregate demand.' 15 As people have reduced consumption in response to
lower incomes, businesses have responded by reducing investment, in a
downward spiral.
The two theories imply different things about regulation. If Summers is
right, then the government needs to engage in stimulative policy, and cutbacks
in regulation may play an important role if monetary policy is failing (as many

See, e.g., ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE
114.
U.S. STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR (2016); Robert J. Gordon, The Demise of U.S.
Economic Growth: Restatement, Rebuttal, and Reflections (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 19895, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl9895; Robert J. Gordon, Is U.S. Economic
Growth Over? Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six Headwinds (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,

Working Paper No. 18315, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl8315.
See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Demand Side Secular Stagnation, 105 AM.
115.
ECON. REV. 60 (2015); Lawrence H. Summers, Reflections on the New Secular Stagnation, in SECULAR
STAGNATION: FACTS, CAUSES AND CURES 27-40 (Coen Teulings & Richard Baldwin, eds. 2014);
Lawrence H. Summers, U.S. Economic Prospects: Secular Stagnation, Hysteresis, and the Zero Lower

Bound, 49 BUS. ECONOMISTS 65 (2014).
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believe) and government spending is stymied by gridlock.116 If Gordon is right,
stimulus will do no good, and we need to become accustomed to low rates of
economic growth.11 7 In Gordon's world, regulation could even become more
stringent: as the returns to investment fall, the opportunity cost of regulation
falls as well, which should be reflected in a reduction of the discount factor
used in cost-benefit analyses of regulation. All of these issues must be worked
out. But the regulatory component of macroeconomic policy deserves more
consideration than it has received.

116.

This is what Summers himself has implied. See Summers & Lipson, supra note

109.
117.
Of course, it is possible that both Gordon and Summers are correct to some
degree. If demand shortfalls are playing any role in slowing economic growth, policymakers should
consider using stimulative regulatory policy.
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